计算机学院学术论坛报告

主题报告：合理、健壮安全的电子商务机制设计
 
报 告 人：Tokuro Matsuo博士[日本Yamagata大学]
 
报告时间：9月 20日（周一）15: 00～16: 30
 
报告地点：上海大学延长校区行健楼707室
 
邀 请 人：缪淮扣 教授
 
论坛主题：As the Internet develops, it is becoming an increasingly prosperous network for many type of commerce. E-Commerce has made rapid progress and realizes an effective trade between buyers and sellers. E-Commerce is also a promising field for applying agent technologies. In this presentation, I introduce the innovative e-commerce researches concerned with negotiation and mechanism design. Particularly, I discuss the auction theory, types of fraud and shill bids in auctions, and a novel method to avoid them as computational mechanism design. In existing economic research and multiagent researches, the auction mechanism is statically designed with analyses of fraud by using traditional micro economics. On the other hand, in the trade on the web, users declare a certain value (e.g. bid value, preferences.) to other users or auctioneer. By using these information, we can design an effective trading mechanism dynamically. Concretely, after the explanation of e-commerce and auction, I will show a new method for discovering and detecting shill bids in combinatorial auctions. As Yokoo et al. pointed out, false-name bids and shill bids pose an emerging problem for auctions, since on the Internet it is easy to establish different e-mail addresses and accounts for auction sites. As a new approach against shill-bids, we designed a mechanism that utilizes VCG and an algorithm for finding potential shill bids. Our mechanism can judge whether there might be a shill bid from the results of the VCG procedure. Our proposed method has the following two key advantages. First, we show a method to detect shill bidders by comparison between bidders utilities. Our method is superior than existing complex mechanisms in the point of view of generalization and wide-use, because our auction mechanism employs only VCG. Second, the schemer, in our mechanism, does never have incentive to make shill bidders. The schemer"s utility does not increase in our mechanism even though a schemer make shill bidders.

报告人简介： Dr. Tokuro Matsuo is an associate professor at Graduate School of Science and Engineering in Yamagata University from 2006. He received the Doctor degree of Engineering from Dept. of Computer Science at Nagoya Institute of Technology in 2006. His current research interests include Career Service System, Safety Service for Disaster Recovery, designs on Secure Electronic Commerce Systems and e-Auction Protocols, Qualitative Reasoning and Simulations. Some of his researches are presented in international conference on AAAI, IEEE CEC, AAMAS, and WWW.